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Summary: Immigrant remittances are a significant source of income and
finance for developing economies, representing about three times’ official de-
velopment assistance and over half of foreign direct investment annually re-
ceived. Major motivations to send remittances are for improving food, health,
and education spending of families at home as well as for investing in entre-
preneurial ventures. Economic policies to channel remittances into develop-
ment finance should translate these motivations into measures to boost social 
investment and local and regional production, linking remittances policies to
broader fiscal, financial and institutional policies. A national development bank
can be a catalyser of public and private interests by supporting the scale up of 
remittances investment programmes and by building partnerships with regional
and multilateral development institutions.
Key words: Immigrant remittances, Development finance, Diasporas,  
Motivations. 
JEL: J15, F39.
 
 
 
 
Until recently, international remittances were defined as the sum of workers’ remit-
tances, compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers. Based on recommenda-
tions by a Technical Working Group on improving remittance data led by the United 
Nations (UN), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 2006 
migrants’ transfers are not included in the definition anymore and workers’ remit-
tances were replaced by the concept of “personal transfers”. In fact, since 2009 the 
IMF defines remittances as: (1) “compensation of employees” and (2) “personal 
transfers” (ACP Observatory on Migration 2011). 
International migrant remittances flows have multiple effects on receiving 
countries. Analysis of positive and negative impacts of remittances have been exam-
ined by numerous specialists for the past thirty years (Ilene Grabel 2008; Richard H. 
Adams Jr. and Alfredo Cuecuecha 2010; Dilip Ratha et al. 2011; Sanket Mohapatra, 
Ratha, and Ani Silwal 2011). Rising steadily during this period, with the exception of 
the recession in 2008-2009, remittances are a significant source of income and fi-
nance for receiving economies. They represent about three times the official devel-
opment assistance and over half of foreign direct investment annually received by 
developing countries. However, policy options for remittances and implementation 
have been much less analysed. In fact, the question remains as to whether appropriate 
policies can boost remittances’ volumes and be more effectively channelled as de-
velopment finance. Yet, it is important to remember that although remittances can 
support development, they cannot be the panacea.   
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This paper tries to grapple with this question. Section 1 evaluates the relevant 
trends of migrant remittances and surveys the motivations behind remittance-senders 
and receiving families. Section 2 assesses the progress attained by remittances poli-
cies implemented by receiving-countries. Section 3 develops a typology of remit-
tances policies that identifies the objectives pursued, the policy instruments used, and 
main hurdles and results found. The typology serves to classify remittances policies 
as fiscal, financial and institutional. This part also proposes a framework to main-
stream remittances into development finance by strengthening national development 
banks and their links with multilateral development institutions. Section 4 draws 
some conclusions. 
 
1. Main Trends and Characteristics of Remittance Flows  
 
Although the World Bank remittances’ data might still understate the actual level of 
remittances, in particular because the level of informal remittances is unknown, they 
are the most complete time series publically available, constantly revised and up-
dated with new research e.g. household surveys and surveys to countries’ Central 
Banks. Recent efforts by the International Fund for Agricultural Development - 
IFAD (2010) on survey data collection are laudable and, although they are not a 
time-series databank, their estimations for some countries can be used as a good ap-
proximation on current remittances to rural areas, in particular. 
International migrant remittances flows to developing countries have been es-
timated at $351 billion in 2011, up 8 per cent over 2010 and projected to reach $414 
billion by 2014. They represent over 70 per cent of worldwide international remit-
tances, which include flows to high-income countries. However, downside risks per-
sist due to slow growth in the US and Europe and persistent unemployment which 
affects employment prospects of immigrants. The main sources of global remittance 
flows are the United States, estimated to record US $53 billion in outward remit-
tances in 2011, followed by Saudi Arabia with $28 billion. Switzerland, Germany, 
and Russian Federation are also important sources of remittances (Mohapatra, Ratha, 
and Silwal 2011). 
 
1.1 Who Send Remittances? 
 
The remittances literature indicates that for African countries and the Latin America 
and the Caribbean region, remittances mainly originate from low-skilled immigrants 
(Manuel Orozco 2004; Pablo Fajnzylber and Humberto Lopez 2008; Mohapatra, 
Ratha, and Silwal 2011; Ratha et al. 2011). The econometric results by Riccardo 
Faini (2007) also indicate that the correlation between the share of skilled migrants 
and remittances is negative, which suggests that the reunification effect (bringing 
close relatives to destination) is stronger than the wage effect (sending remittances).  
In the same vein, the study for 71 developing countries by Adams Jr. (2008) 
finds that countries that export a larger share of high-skilled (educated) migrants re-
ceive less per capita remittances than countries that export a larger proportion of low-
skilled migrants. In the same study, instrumental variable results suggest that a 10 per 
cent increase in the share of high-skilled migrants from a labor-sending country  
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would reduce the amount of per capita remittances received by 11.2 - 19.7 per cent, 
while a similar 10 per cent increase in the share of low-skilled migrants would in-
crease the level of remittances received by 9.1 - 19.8 per cent. 
One possible explanation is that either high-skilled migrants come from upper-
class families that might not expect remittances or that families are more likely to 
join migrants at destinations, so savings, consumption and investment would mainly 
occur at migrants’ destinations (Yoko Niimi, Caglar Ozden, and Maurice Schiff 
2008). In contrast, for low-skilled immigrants, many of them coming from a work-
ing-class background, sending remittances can be a better option since hard currency 
with often higher and more stable purchasing power than domestic currencies can 
support basic consumption, health and education spending, microfinance, and pur-
chasing of land and housing.  
Nonetheless, a cross-country study that covers different developing regions by 
Frederic Docquier, Hillel Rapoport, and Sara Salomone (2011) finds that high-skilled 
migrants are more likely to send remittances than low-skilled migrants when immi-
gration laws are restrictive. This finding might indicate that low-skilled immigrants 
are more sensitive to restrictive immigration laws so they would return home or 
spend/invest more at destinations, particularly when they are undocumented. It is 
also possible that the study did not consider the fact that restrictive immigration 
might coincide with higher rates of unemployment and lower wages for low skilled 
immigrants e.g. last Great Recession, so they would not save enough to keep remit-
tances at same levels. The study does not provide enough information on its assump-
tions and data gathering to have a more definite response.  
 
1.2 Which Motivations are Behind Sending Remittances? 
 
In general, remittances flows are mainly sent for food, clothing, health, and school 
spending, although purchasing durables, land, and starting a small business are also 
important items. However, immigrants’ interests in sending remittances are context-
specific, varying from region to region and from country to country. 
The Orozco (2004) study found that in the case of Mexico, Nicaragua and El 
Salvador no less than 75 per cent of remittances are spent in food items. The United 
Nations (2007) study on Guatemala also indicated that 50 per cent of remittances 
were used for consumption goods (food, clothing), though men spent slightly more 
on these items than women, who spent slightly more on health and education. In the 
case of Albania the proportion of remittances spent on food items is 63 per cent and 
25 per cent on durables (Adriana Castaldo and Barry Reilly 2007). Similarly, while 
50 per cent of remittances flows to Kenya are spent in land purchases, building 
houses, businesses, improving the farm, agricultural equipment and other invest-
ments, in Nigeria 20 per cent of remittances are spent in purchasing land (Ratha et al. 
2011). In the case of Indonesian immigrants in Hong Kong (China) and Japan, remit-
tances are mainly sent for education and savings, similar to the choice made by Ma-
laysian immigrants in Japan (Asian Development Bank 2006).   
In countries where most of the remittances are received by the poorest, a lar-
ger proportion of remittances are used in food, clothing and other basic consumption 
goods. For example, the study by Adams Jr. and Cuecuecha (2010) on Indonesian  
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households found that comparing households receiving remittances in 2007 with a 
counterfactual situation in which they did not receive remittances, households receiv-
ing remittances increased their marginal expenditures on food by 8.5 per cent, and 
reduced their marginal expenditures on housing by 39.1 per cent. 
From the point of view of the immigrant, buying land, a house (or building 
one), is an investment. These are assets that could potentially increase in value and 
whose services might provide a rent, while also reduce risks associated with the need 
of liquidity or a loan collateral. For the case of Guatemala, Adams Jr. (2005) argues 
that households receiving remittances spent less at the margin on consumption and 
more on investment goods such as housing, education, and health. The importance of 
education for economic growth and development has been noted by Marta C. N. 
Simões (2011). For migrants, increased expenditures on housing represent a type of 
investment as well as a form of local economic development by creating new income 
and employment opportunities for skilled and unskilled workers. Ratha et al. (2011) 
indicate that older Nigerian immigrants are more likely to invest in housing in their 
hometown and devote a larger share of household income to housing investments 
than younger migrants. In fact, housing investments may “be the first stage of a 
broader investment relationship between migrants and their countries of origin”. 
In sum, remittances are private transfers received by family relatives to be 
used for private consumption, saved or invested in health, education (social invest-
ment), real estate and small businesses. However, the impact of remittances on do-
mestic demand and finance grows since they circulate widely throughout the receiv-
ing economy, as a sizable part of effective demand and as a financial leverage for 
production and trade. In fact, remittances are channelled by market forces and can 
alter private finance. While their impact is broadly shaped by economic policies, re-
mittances can also change the expected outcome of these policies e.g. trade, mone-
tary. The question is whether developmental-oriented economic policies can channel 
remittances more effectively towards development finance. 
 
1.3 Significance of Remittances as a Source of Income and Finance 
 
Much has been written on the stability and counter-cyclical nature of remittances 
flows; however, new studies have begun to cast doubts on them. For a detailed sum-
mary of those discussions see Grabel (2008). Table 1 indicates that remittances flows 
to developing countries of all income-levels have grown exponentially since 1980; 
they duplicated during the decade 1990-1999 relative to 1980-1989 and tripled there-
after. Growth of remittances in low-income countries has been five times higher in 
2000-2009 relative to 1990-1999, while remittances to least developed countries 
(LDCs) have also shown significant growth. However, low-income countries do not 
receive the bulk of remittances. Over 90 per cent of the volume of remittances is 
concentrated in middle-income countries, which have tripled their volumes of remit-
tances received between 1990-1999 and 2000-2009. 
From Table 2 it could be inferred that the growth of remittances during 2000- 
2009 helps to keep low-income countries afloat. Remittances represented six per cent  
of low-income countries’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2000-2009, higher than  
in 1990-1999 when they were only one per cent. The remittances per capita ratio  
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Table 1   Remittance Flows to Developing Countries (US$ billion), Per Decade 
 
   1980-1989 1990-1999  2000-2009 
Remittances to developing countries  217  499  1,762 
LDCs   18  40  132 
Low-income countries  11  21  113 
Middle-income countries  194  457  1,610 
High-income countries  11  21  39 
 
Source: Elaborated based on data provided by World Developed Indicators Database.1  
 
Table 2   Remittance Flows and Ratios, by Income Level and LDCs, Per Decade 
 
  
Low income countries 
1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009/2010 
Remittances as a % of exports  7  9  28 
Remittances as a % of GDP  1  1  6 
Remittances as a % of ODA  22  29  100 
Remittances per capita (US$)  3  4  17 
  Middle income countries 
Remittances as a % of exports  5  5  7 
Remittances as a % of GDP  1  1  2 
Remittances as a % of ODA  165  228  641 
Remittances per capita (US$)  6  12  38 
  High income countries 
Remittances as a % of exports  0  0  0 
Remittances as a % of GDP  0  0  0 
Remittances as a % of ODA  54  108  15,652 
Remittances per capita (US$)  15  22  39 
  LDCs 
Remittances as a % of exports  10  14  19 
Remittances as a % of GDP  1  2  5 
Remittances as a % of ODA  29  46  99 
Remittances per capita (US$)  4  7  19 
 
Notes: 2009 is latest data available for Exports of Good and Services, GDP and ODA. 2010 is latest data available for 
Population and Remittances. 
Source: United Nations, World Bank, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2 
 
also grew four times during that time. Similarly, the ratio of total remittances to total 
exports was 28 per cent during 2000-2009, while the total remittances received be-
came equivalent to total official development assistance (ODA). A similar trend was 
visible in LDCs. For middle-income countries, remittances did not represent more 
than 2 per cent of GDP in 2000-2009; however, the remittances per capita indicator 
was 38, which doubles the figure of low-income countries. 
The study by Adams Jr. (2008) suggests that an inverted-U shaped curve ex-
ists between the levels of per capita income and per capita remittances in a country. 
                                                        
1 World Bank. 2011. World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators. 
2 OECD. 2012. http://www.oecd.org/statistics/ (accessed February 20, 2012).  
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With all other factors held constant, the level of per capita remittances received by a 
country increases until a country has a per capita income of about $2,200 per year, 
and falls thereafter. Thus, middle-income countries receive more per capita remit-
tances than low- or high- income countries.  
More broadly, Table 3 indicates that while remittances are as important as 
ODA for low-income countries, they are as important as foreign direct investment 
(FDI) for middle-income countries. For Sub-Saharan Africa, ODA, FDI and remit-
tances are all equally important, contrasting with Asia where remittances constitute 
55 per cent of the main external inflows, higher than FDI (39 per cent) and ODA (6 
per cent).
3 In Latin America and the Caribbean region, FDI flows represent 53 per 
cent of the main external inflows, followed by remittances (43 per cent) and ODA (4 
per cent). On the other hand, for the sample of developing countries provided in Ta-
ble 3, remittances are the most important source of finance, except for (middle-
income) emergent countries such as South Africa, Brazil and China where FDI is 
more important. 
 
Table 3   External Finance Inflows to Developing Countries, 2009 
 
Income groups, regions, and 
sample of countries 
FDI (net)  ODA  Remittances  Total 
% GDP 
% External 
flows %  GDP
% External 
flows %  GDP 
% External 
flows %  GDP
% External 
flows 
  All developing countries  1.4  41.7  0.3  9.3  1.7  49.0  3.4  100 
High-income countries  0.4  58.1  0.0  0.3  0.3  41.7  0.6  100 
Middle-income countries  1.6  44.2  0.2  6.2  1.8  49.6  3.6  100 
Low-income countries  1.4  10.6  5.9  43.9  6.1  45.5  13.4  100 
  Region                 
  Africa  2.6  36.4  2.1  28.6  2.5  35.0  7.2  100 
       South Africa  1.4  69.6  0.3  14.8  0.3  15.5  2.0  100 
       Sub-Saharan Africa  2.7  35.9  2.6  33.8  2.3  30.3  7.6  100 
  Asia  1.2  39.0  0.2  6.5  1.6  54.5  3.0  100 
       Bangladesh  0.8  6.0  0.8  6.0  11.8  88.0  13.4  100 
       China   1.4  58.5  0.0  1.0  1.0  40.5  2.4  100 
       India  1.5  27.8  12.0  2.2  3.9  70.0  5.5  100 
       Pakistan  1.4  18.4  0.8  10.8  5.4  70.8  7.7  100 
       Philippines  1.0  7.4  0.2  1.1  12.3  91.5  13.5  100 
  Latin America and the Caribbean  1.7  52.5  0.1  4.1  1.4  43.3  3.2  100 
       Brazil  2.3  88.8  0.0  0.8  0.3  10.4  2.6  100 
       El Salvador  1.7  8.9  1.2  6.3  16.5  84.3  19.5  100 
       Mexico  1.0  27.3  0.0  0.5  2.5  72.2  3.5  100 
 
Source: United Nations, World Bank, OECD. 4 
 
Overall, international migrant remittances have become a finance-of-last resort 
in low-income countries, and as part of a diversified portfolio of finance in middle-
income countries.  
                                                        
3 Incidentally, it is worth to mention the work by Leonce Ndikumana and James K. Boyce (2011) indicat-
ing that Sub-Saharan countries are net creditors to the rest of the world (finance outflows) with an esti-
mated US$800 billion in capital flight through 2008. 
4 OECD. 2012. http://www.oecd.org/statistics/ (accessed February 20, 2012).  
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2. Remittances Programmes and Policies Implemented 
 
For the past twenty years the remittance policy literature has made progress on as-
sessing different aspects of remittances such as a) the implementation of regulatory 
frameworks to reduce transfer costs in different corridors; b) the support to financial 
inclusion; c) the support to investment motivations of diasporas. The next paragraphs 
briefly elaborate on some of these issues. 
 
2.1 Cost-Reduction of Transferring Remittances 
 
These policies have been applied to enhance competition in the remittance market, 
improve payment systems, and increase transparency (Fajnzylber and López 2007).  
On the whole, the average remittance cost, weighted by bilateral remittance 
flows, has consistently declined for the past twenty years. More recently, average 
remittance costs fell from 8.8 per cent in 2008 to 7.3 per cent in the third quarter of 
2011. In particular, costs have continued falling in high volume remittance corridors, 
such as from the US to Mexico, UK to India and Bangladesh, and France to North 
Africa.  
In fact, for the past two decades the cost of remittances transfer has declined 
for the Latin America-United States and Latin America-Spain corridors, averaging 5-
7 per cent for every $200 of remittances. Likewise, the average transfer cost is 3-5 
per cent for the corridors that link Singapore or the United Arab Emirates with South 
Asian countries.  
An example of cost-reduction to transfer remittances is the bilateral agreement 
for coordination between the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and the Mexican Cen-
tral Bank. Through this program, called “Directo a México”, the existing payment 
infrastructure of both countries is connected, thus lowering the costs of transfers for 
payments from US bank accounts to Mexican banks accounts (Raúl Hernández-Coss 
2005). Originally created for the transfer of pension payments to Mexico, this 
mechanism is now promoted especially for remittances transfers at one of the lowest 
fees in this corridor. One reason for the low cost is the usage of the FIX - the inter-
bank exchange rate – minus a small spread (0,21%) as reference exchange rate for 
the transaction. In general, MTOs apply less favorable exchange rates, thereby ele-
vating transfer costs considerably.  
However, progress has been uneven. Figure 1 indicates that the weighted av-
erage cost for sending $200 is most expensive in the Middle East & North Africa and 
East Asia & Pacific recipient regions, while it is less costly in South Asia and Latin 
America & Caribbean regions. For the latter regions, it has been fundamental the 
efforts displayed to increase market competition among MTOs and wider application 
of cheaper and appropriate remittance technology.  
Transfer costs of various corridors within Africa, particularly the ones that 
link South Africa with Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and Botswana are 
as high as 17-22 per cent. The cost includes the transaction fee and the exchange rate 
margin. The cost also averages 16-19 per cent for corridors linking Japan to Brazil, 
India, China and Korea (Mohapatra, Ratha, and Silwal 2011). 
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Source: Mohapatra, Ratha, and Silwal (2011). 
 
Figure 1  Weighted Average Cost of Remitting $200 to Developing Regions, Third-quarter 2011 ($) 
 
The disparities and high transfer costs in different corridors have been exam-
ined by the G8 and the G20 countries, and both have agreed to the objective of re-
ducing global average remittance costs by 5 percentage points in 5 years (“5 by 
5”objective). 
 
2.2 Financial Inclusion of the Unbanked  
 
These policies are directed to give migrants and families’ access to bank accounts 
and other financial products such as consumer loans, mortgages, life and non-life 
insurance products and pensions (Donald F. Terry and Steven R. Wilson 2005).  
There are examples of the financial inclusion of the unbanked. On the remit-
tance-receiving side, a prominent attempt of improving Mexican migrants’ families 
access to financial services is “L@Red de la Gente” (Network of the People). This 
network was founded by the Mexican national development bank BANSEFI (Banco 
de Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros) and includes over 180 credit unions and 
other MFIs with more than 1600 branches. Cooperating with various US-based 
MTOs, L@Red de la Gente offers remittance-based services in Mexican rural and 
urban areas with low incomes and high migration density, which are often not cov-
ered by the official banking system. A new initiative of the Red to foster the bancari-
sation of its clients is the “Beneficiary Account Registration” (BAR) mechanism 
through which a remittance-sender in the US can open a bank account in the name of 
a recipient family member in a credit union branch in Mexico. The receiver then has 
to formalize the account personally when receiving the remittances. 
In El Salvador, the cooperation between market and civil society organizations 
has led toward the financial inclusion of many people living in small towns and rural 
areas (IFAD 2010). The Federation of Associations of Savings and Credit Coopera-
tives (Federación de Asociaciones Cooperativas de Ahorro y Crédito de El Salvador, 
FEDECACES) offers remittance services to its clients since 1998. It cooperates with 
a group of US-based MTOs by channeling money transfers directly to its branches 
often located in areas where MTOs have no presence. Receivers have the option to 
join one of the cooperatives opening an account and/or get access to other financial 
products like loans or insurances.  
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2.3 Support to Investment Motivations of Diasporas 
 
Definitions of diasporas vary across countries; thus for a discussion on definitions of 
diasporas see Ratha et al. (2011). Specialists have written profusely on diasporas po-
tential for contributing more effectively to the development of remittance-receiving 
countries (Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias 2006; Metka Hercog and Melissa Siegel 2011; 
Rebecca Davies 2012). Some of these countries have given the right to dual national-
ity in order to facilitate close links between migrants and their home country and en-
sure continuity of remittance flows. Ratha et al. (2011) argue that dual-citizenship is 
a relevant factor for diaspora’s participation in trade, investment, and technology 
transfer, while it makes easier to travel to, remit and own land in the origin country. 
A host country’s citizenship can improve migrants’ earnings and their ability to send 
remittances to and invest in the origin country. Information available indicates the 
following twenty African countries allowing double citizenship: Algeria, Angola, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leon, South 
Africa, Togo, Tunisia, and Uganda.  
On the other hand, the Salvadorian government institutionalized diaspora poli-
cies by creating the General Directorate for the Communities Abroad (Dirección 
General de Atención a la Comunidad en el Exterior, DGACE) as part of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in 2000. In addition, a special Vice-Ministry for Salvadorians 
Abroad (Viceministerio de Relaciones Exteriores para los Salvadoreños en el Exte-
rior) was created in 2004. The DGACE organizes its activities along three main lines: 
cultural, economic and social programs.  
Under the Temporary and Circular Labour Migration programme (TCLM) be-
tween Colombia and Spain, specific efforts have been made in Spain to promote the 
contribution of migrants to local development upon their return to Colombia. This 
includes training in entrepreneurship, consultancy workshops aimed at defining and 
formulating productive social initiatives, courses for co-development community 
projects, and mentoring in the preparation of business plans. 
In an effort to capture the saving capacity of immigrants demonstrated by their 
remittances to families, a few countries have issued diaspora bonds as a way to fi-
nance development projects. Although diaspora bonds are not remittances, their fi-
nance source is the same e.g. immigrants’ savings, and both share some degree of 
substitution. This is particularly the case of institutional remittances which are often 
sent for local and regional development projects. 
Policies in Israel and India have been relatively successful in engaging diaspo-
ras in the purchase of investment bonds, raising about US$40 billion (Ratha et al. 
2011). In the case of India, the government has devised incentives so diasporas 
would send and invest money in India’s growing economy. It has eased regulations 
and controls, eliminated the black-market premium on the rupee, and created conven-
ient remittances services. The Indian and international banks have systematically 
shifted remittances from the informal “hawala” channels to formal channels. Indians 
abroad have also responded to several attractive deposit schemes and bonds offered 
at home. Yet, except for the successful launch of diaspora bonds for Israel and India, 
the hard numbers showing the engagement of diasporas with their countries of origin 
are still elusive.  
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3. A Framework for Mainstreaming Remittances into 
Development Finance  
 
Remittances policies across countries for the past twenty years or so have had multi-
ple objectives, uses, and results. The next subsection is an effort to synthesize and 
classify them at the macroeconomic level. The idea is to provide a wider view of re-
mittances policies both in terms of country implementation and degree of application 
and potential for mainstreaming remittance policies into national development poli-
cies.  
 
3.1 A Typology of Remittances Policies  
 
Table 4 classifies remittances policies according to objectives such as either increas-
ing remittances inflows or increasing their effective use, although there are unavoid-
able overlaps between both objectives because it is not always possible to separate 
the impact of those policies.  
 
Table 4   A Typology of Remittance Policies Implemented by Countries 
 
General 
objectives  Policies  Instruments, projects, products   Goals  Country examples  Hurdles  Results 
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
f
l
o
w
 
o
f
 
r
e
m
i
t
t
a
n
c
e
s
 
F
i
s
c
a
l
 
Development bonds, diaspora bonds, 
infrastructure Development Bond (Nepal); 
Diaspora Social Investment Fund 
(Liberia), Diaspora Mutual Fund 
(Rwanda), First Investment Fund 
(Zambia). 
Finance public 
investment, 
enhance relations 
with diaspora. 
China, India, 
Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, Pakistan; 
Israel; Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Lebanon, 
Philippines, Nepal. 
Financial illiteracy, 
little awareness; need 
of tailored 
programmes to low 
and skilled migrants. 
Vary. Good results for 
Israel and India ($40 
billion raised), and 
Lebanon; still early to 
assess in others. 
Exemption from taxes and state 
inspections for migrant firms; tax-break 
for remitting thru banks; buy land at 
preferential prices. 
Promote 
investment, 
savings. 
Egypt; Moldova. Benefit remittance 
receivers, not wider 
population; link with 
national development 
objectives. 
No much evaluation 
(see also Alexander 
C. O’Neill 2001). 
Tax to remittances; reduction of national 
compulsory service of male migrants if 
paying ‘fine’ in foreign exchange; 
requirement of a percentage of earnings 
for government fund. 
Increase fiscal 
revenues. 
Ecuador, Peru, 
Georgia, Poland; 
Turkey; Viet Nam. 
Reduction of 
remittances, tax 
evasion. 
Increase informal 
remittances. 
Tax-breaks on imported capital goods; 
preferential access to import of capital 
goods and raw materials . 
Promote 
investment. 
Philippines; India, 
Pakistan. 
Link with national 
development 
objectives. 
No evaluation found. 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
(
M
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
)
 
Preferential interest rates for savings and 
credit; interests exempt from income tax. 
Promote inclusive 
finance, facilitate 
seed-investment, 
home ownership. 
India, Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka, Pakistan, 
Tunisia; Albania. 
Financial illiteracy; 
links with national 
development 
objectives. 
No evaluation found. 
Preferential exchange rates; “inter-bank 
exchange rate”; reduction of commission 
rates, monitoring units in banks. 
Promote 
investment, lower 
transfer cost. 
India, Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka, Pakistan, 
Mexico. 
Links with national 
development 
objectives. 
Good.
Foreign currency accounts. Promote inclusive 
finance, 
investment. 
India, Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka, Pakistan, 
Nepal, Tunisia, 
Guatemala. 
Links with 
development 
objectives. 
Good.
I
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n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
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Governments set up Migrant service 
bureaus, official representations; 
international money transfers go thru 
Central Bank or controlled by state; 
business advisory services; bank 
counselling on local investment 
opportunities; dual citizenship. 
Support 
investment; 
enhance relations 
between 
government and 
diasporas; regulate 
foreign exchange 
flows and trade. 
Albania, Philippines; 
Brasil, Viet Nam; 
Pakistan; Thailand; 
Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, 
Peru, El Salvador, 
Mexico, Panama, 
Uruguay, Kenya. 
Governments are 
prone to “moral 
hazard”; alienation 
from policies on dual-
nationality and 
political inclusion. 
A good start; mainly to 
use the economic 
potential of diasporas, 
not their political 
influence.  
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(
w
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e
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i
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n
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l
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s
u
p
p
o
r
t
)
  Matched funding: local or federal 
government allocate $2 or more for every 
$1 invested in community of origin to 
finance various infrastructure; training 
remittance-receiver entrepreneurs and 
migrants, provide technical assistance to 
start-up businesses. 
Promote 
community 
development 
(remodel churches, 
schools, purchase 
small fire trucks); 
encourage migrant 
associations and 
individual migrants 
to invest . 
Mexico, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Costa 
Rica, Peru, 
Nicaragua, Brasil, 
Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Uruguay, 
Dominican 
Republic, Argentina, 
Guyana. 
Federal organization 
decides projects, not 
the HTAs; HTAs are 
not investment 
groups; difficulty 
identifying 
businesses with link 
to diasporas. Scale 
up of projects. 
Executing agencies 
need business 
expertise. 
Technical assistance 
provided to start-up 
businesses. Good at 
local level, no much 
impact at regional and 
national levels. 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
Loans to families using remittances as 
guarantee; housing loans (mortgages). 
Promote inclusive 
finance; access to 
real estate. 
Moldova, 
Guatemala, Peru, 
Mexico, Colombia, 
Ecuador, El 
Salvador. 
Benefit remittance 
receivers, not the rest 
of population. 
Scaling-up. Loan 
repay (higher 
amounts and longer 
terms than other 
loans). 
Financial inclusion of 
senders and 
receivers; increase 
home ownership; 
inclusion of remittance 
flows in loans is now 
widespread. 
Bankarization: electronic transfers, 
microfinance, certificate of deposits; 
“remittance transfer cost calculator”; “Red 
de La Gente”; “Beneficiary Account 
Registration”; Federation of Associations 
of Savings and Credit Cooperatives. 
Promote inclusive 
finance; banks’ 
partnerships and 
bilateral agree-
ments in remit-
tance markets; 
lower transfer 
costs. 
Nepal, Mexico-USA, 
Albania-
Greece/Italy; Co-
lombia, Mexico, El 
Salvador, Guate-
mala, Philippines, 
Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, Nica-
ragua, Bolivia, Haiti, 
Peru, Paraguay, 
Honduras. 
Governance capac-
ity-building needs; 
liquidity manage-
ment; profitability of 
remittance-transfer 
services in small 
entities. Scaling-up. 
Financial inclusion 
and education of 
senders and receiv-
ers; increased access 
of MFIs to remittance 
flows; design of new 
products (savings 
account linked to debit 
cards; housing and 
business loans); build 
trust in financial 
institutions. 
Development Immigrant Bank as part of 
national development strategy; immigrant 
welfare funds. 
Leverage use of 
remittances and 
their multiplier 
effects. 
Bangladesh. Integration of immi-
grant bank within 
national development 
plan. 
Still early to say. 
Securitization (used at least once by one 
of the countries). 
Use remittances 
flows as collateral 
for loans. 
Brazil, Turkey, El 
Salvador, Panama, 
Jamaica, Colombia, 
Kazakhstan, Arab 
Republic of Egypt, 
Russian Federation, 
South Africa, Re-
public of Korea. 
Sovereign risk during 
crisis periods. 
Fairly good, still on 
experimental phase. 
Larger potential. 
Insurance for non-migrant relatives 
(health, life); pension funds, saving 
packages; tourism packages. 
Support social 
development. 
Guatemala. Scaling-up. Good at micro level. 
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
Assistance to institutions to improve 
policy, legal and regulatory frameworks 
for remittance transfers and their use, 
establishing standards and practices. 
Boost competitive-
ness (reduce 
transfer cost) and 
more accurate 
assessment of 
remittances flows. 
India, Mexico, El 
Salvador, Albania, 
Honduras, Brasil, 
Colombia, Guate-
mala, Haiti. 
Institutional imple-
mentation. 
Reduced transfer cost 
to 5 per cent in Latin 
America-US and Latin 
America-Spain corri-
dors (for $200 remit-
tances); governments 
are more aware of 
amount of remittances 
(periodic and more 
accurate measure-
ments). 
Financial literacy through education 
programmes, information; training to set 
up micro-businesses; National Action 
Plan on Remittances (improve data, 
expand banking, develop partnerships 
between banks and those in the main 
destination countries). 
Strengthen finan-
cial depth, increase 
knowledge of 
formal remittance 
channels and 
formal banking 
sector. 
Albania, Moldova, 
Mexico, Brazil, 
Colombia, Haiti, 
Nicaragua, Peru, 
Dominican Repub-
lic, Costa Rica. 
Extend programme to 
non-receiving fami-
lies. 
Good, but market 
demand for financial 
literacy is still unat-
tended. 
Immigrant resource centres. Information on 
remittances trans-
fer options, negoti-
ate lower costs 
with MTOs and 
speed up transfer, 
inform on invest-
ment opportunities, 
fund schools 
construction, social 
infrastructure. 
Philippines, Repub-
lic of Congo, Tajiki-
stan. 
Political influence. Fairly good at micro 
level. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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In principle, remittances policies can be classified as fiscal, financial, and in-
stitutional. The importance of fiscal and monetary policies for development has been 
underscored by Philip Arestis (2011). The review of the remittances literature sug-
gests that there are only 44 countries that have implemented some kind of remit-
tances policies, which represent about a third of all developing countries receiving 
remittances.  
Fiscal and financial policies are the most common used to increase remittances 
flows, while financial and institutional policies are the most often used to improve 
remittances effectiveness. In the former case, the instruments used include develop-
ment bonds, various kinds of tax incentives to import fixed capital or remit through 
the banking system as well as preferential interest rates, exchange rates, and the set 
up of foreign currency accounts; while in the latter case the main objectives are to 
promote investment and inclusive finance. The complexity of exchange rates policies 
for emerging and transition economies, for example, can be found in Celine Gimet 
(2011). 
The instruments used include electronic transfers, microfinance, various types 
of insurance as well as the establishment of regulatory frameworks for remittances 
transfer and their use; financial literacy programmes, and training for start-up busi-
nesses. The main goals are the reduction of transfer costs, use of remittances as col-
lateral for loans and securitization, and inclusive finance.  
The main hurdles for remittances policies have to do with the need of capacity 
building and the scale-up of microfinance programmes. Capacity building includes 
the areas of project design, IT training, and management skills. Also, much focus on 
investment in microenterprises has overlooked the access to bigger finance by small 
firms. An indirect effect of this has been the inadequate attention to the links between 
local, regional and national as well as a higher probability that microfinance pro-
grammes stayed isolated from broader development objectives and thus with not 
enough funding. 
The various motivations for sending remittances shed light on the diversity of 
immigrants’ priorities and interests, which provide input for integrating them within 
broader strategies of development. Setting up businesses, purchase real estate, ac-
quire durable goods, invest on capital goods, and support households’ food consump-
tion, education and health spending (in both rural and urban areas) would indicate 
migrants eagerness to support social and economic development projects. State sup-
port in those sectors can leverage the finance potential of remittances with policies 
that can scale up local and regional development projects and effectively merge local 
development with broader developmental goals. 
Migrants are likely to participate in larger investment programmes that can 
boost their access to income-producing assets and other entrepreneurial interests. In 
fact, the study of 71 developing countries by Adams Jr. (2008) concludes that the 
level of per capita remittances received by a country is positively related to invest-
ment returns at home. In all versions of the remittance model presented, all of the 
coefficients measuring real interest rates at home are positively and significantly re-
lated to the level of per capita remittances received by a country. In this study, coun-
tries with more competitive real interest rates receive more per capita remittances.  
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Thus empirical evidence suggests that migrants’ interests in sending remit-
tances to families can intersect with larger national goals to boost both economic and 
social investment. In this sense, the next sub-section assesses the feasibility of a na-
tional development bank to support the convergence of both immigrant and national 
interests, and leverage the use of remittances from individual to local, regional and 
national development projects. 
 
3.2 A National Development Bank to Harness Immigrants’ Interests  
 
Strengthening or creating a national development bank to harness remittances’ de-
velopment finance potential within a national development strategy framework can 
thus be appropriate, as much as developing links with regional and multilateral de-
velopment finance. Central Banks can also require private banks to deposit part of 
their reserves (10-15 per cent) in a national development bank, with the objectives of: 
a) to channel the liquidity surplus generated by remittances into development pro-
jects; b) to support capital formation of the national development bank; and c) to in-
vite private banks to be partners of development projects.  
More specifically, the National Development Bank would mainly serve to: 
i. Support institutional building at the local and regional levels in the eco-
nomic, financial, educational, and health sectors to stimulate a higher multiplicative 
impact of remittances. More specifically, the bank should support “development 
community” projects by developing local networks in which small and medium 
firms, financial organizations, health centres, schools and families link each other to 
exchange and leverage the use of resources with enhanced services of finance, educa-
tion, health services, and labour.  
ii. Harness the extra liquidity provided by remittances flows for investment in 
economic and social development, giving access remittance-receivers and non-
receivers to investment in public projects of infrastructure (electricity, roads, rail-
roads, public transportation), tourism, agriculture, and small businesses (clothing, gas 
stations, car repair and assemblage).  
iii. Support development finance and reduce its unequal access by mobilizing 
internal and international resources, private and public. In the context of remittances, 
the bank should strengthen its links with multilateral development institutions and 
support the remittance investment projects being implemented. 
iv. Develop products and services for investment in public infrastructure, 
teaming with the private sector. The bank should ensure the participation of private 
banks by offering subsidies or lower interest rates to finance immigrants’ projects in 
agriculture, health, education and transport and communication projects. While in-
vestment in public infrastructure might be in tandem with national development pri-
orities, these should merge national with local and regional development priorities.  
Multilateral development banks can support countries by developing ties with 
national development banks. In dialogue with governments’ priorities, these banks 
can support financing for community and regional projects, including productive ac-
tivities that use remittances as finance. They can help to improve the capacity devel-
opment of communities and harness the strengths of both private and public sectors 
by identifying priority areas, creating joint-products, crafting appropriate incentives 
and responsibilities, and setting up the timeframe for the achievement of goals.   
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Although internal and external hurdles might exist to prevent growth of devel-
opment finance, and more concretely, a decided support to national development 
banks, for the past twenty-five years most governments in remittance-receiving coun-
tries have not done much for supporting, channelling and leveraging the use of those 
flows for development purposes. They have indulged on remittances’ sheer magni-
tudes and used them for reducing fiscal and balance of payments or support mis-
guided economic policies e.g. Philippines, Guatemala. A reduced policy space due to 
external and internal group/institutional pressures might be true in some cases, but 
governments need also to develop leadership in exploring policy alternatives that can 
support remittance-receiving families’ use of remittances not only as “cash and 
spend” instrument, but as a way to provide the poor with access to finance and better 
public goods (e.g. education, health and housing). 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Economic policies to channel remittances into development finance should be able to 
translate remittance-receivers motivations for food, health, and education spending 
into measures that boost social development and local and regional production. 
Remittances have become a finance-of-last resort in low-income countries, 
and as part of a diversified portfolio of finance in middle-income countries. For both 
sets of countries, remittances policies should be linked to broader fiscal, financial and 
institutional policies, and embedded within national development strategies.  
A national development bank can be the catalizer for harnessing public and 
private interests on remittances, support the scale up of remittances investment pro-
grammes, and build-up partnerships with regional and multilateral development insti-
tutions supporting remittances as development finance.   
The role of remittances as a source of development finance should not be 
magnified. As countries develop their importance in total resource flows decrease, 
with the share of domestic and other external resources (e.g. FDI) rising in impor-
tance.   
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